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.Kissinger was encouraged by the relative mildness with which Brezhnev criticized recent American bombing.He alsonoted the Soviet leader’s enthusiasm for the summit, especially 250reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 251mo scow 1972Brezhnev’s comment that “certain forces in the world” would“gloat” to see the Chinese summit come off while the Soviet summit did not.76Next day, April 22, they had another five-hour session.Kissinger outlined proposals he wished to submit if the North Vietnamese agreed to a private meeting in Paris on May 2.Essentially he suggested a return to the status quo before March 30, an immediate exchange of long-term prisoners and a serious effort to negotiate a settlement within a set period of time.Brezhnev, transparently keen to get on to summit business, promised to submit these proposals to Hanoi.In his memoirs Kissinger presented all this as a victory for his toughness.77 He did not mention the carrot he had also offered to Hanoi.The United States, he told Brezhnev the previous day, had two principal objectives in Vietnam:“to bring about an honor-able withdrawal of all our forces” and “to put a time interval between our withdrawal and the political process which would then start.We are prepared to let the real balance of forces in Vietnam determine the future of Vietnam.We are not committed to a permanent political involvement there.” In other words the Nixon administration would tolerate a united, communist Vietnam as long as this did not seem the direct result of American withdrawal.78Kissinger was operating way beyond his instructions.On thenight of the 21st, in fact, Nixon instructed Alexander Haig to tell Kissinger that the “summit is not to be discussed further until Vietnam is settled.”79 The president had retreated to Camp David to help conceal Kissinger’s absence, leaving him nothing to do but fret, especially when communications problems delayed reports of Kissinger’s meetings.The presence of his crony Bebe Rebozo and plenty of booze did not help his mood.The result was a succession of fractious telegrams, which usually arrived hours after they were relevant.Being outside the official State Department communications system played into Kissinger’s hands.He was free to play his favorite role, that of the Lone Ranger.80Brezhnev had promised only to submit Kissinger’s proposals toHanoi, not to press for their acceptance.But, judging that he could make no further progress on Vietnam, Kissinger ignored Nixon’s 251reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 252sum m i t sorders and let Brezhnev present his scenarios for the summit, reasoning that the president could always reject them if he wanted a showdown.81 This was probably right.Face to face across the table, he could sense, in a way Nixon could not, the Soviet leader’s keenness to meet the president.But Kissinger needed to discuss the summit for more personalreasons.In the back channel he had made a serious mistake over arms control, and the situation had to be retrieved before final negotiations.Nixon’s May 20, 1971, statement about SALT indicated that thetwo sides would seek agreements in two linked areas: limiting the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs) and what was vaguely described as “certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.”82 Most of Kissinger’s attention in 1971–2 had been devoted to ABMs, partly because of divergent Soviet and American priorities but also because of the divisions on the issue within Washington.During his talks with Brezhnev the outlines of a deal were confirmed: each country would be allowed two ABM systems, one of them to protect its capital.More difficult was pinning down the other element of a SALT agreement, afreeze on “offensive strategic weapons.” In the back channel this phrase had become a synonym for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), on which Kissinger focused because of the Pentagon’s concern about the Soviet arsenal
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